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“We have to diminish the idea that technology is going to change warfare . . . 
War is primarily a human endeavor.”
— General James N. Mattis, U.S. Marine Corps, Commander, U.S. Joint Forces and NATO Supreme Allied Command
THE WORLD SEEMED to breathe a collective sigh of relief at the end of the long Cold War. That momentous event, however, did not mark the 
end of global armed conflict. While the number of armed conflicts worldwide 
has been declining since peaking in the early 1990s,1 and a conventional war 
between two large states seems unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future, 
community conflicts and a “growing number of increasingly disorderly 
spaces” that may facilitate even more such conflicts now characterize the 
global security environment.2
Citizens of our globalized community may no longer need to lie anxiously 
awake in their beds at night, wondering if the world will be there in the 
morning, but the current climate of disorder may cause death by a thou-
sand small cuts. These are “small wars,”3 insurgencies,4 localized intrastate 
civil conflicts that emerge from disruptive political, economic, and social 
problems. Nearly 80 percent of the surges in armed violence over the past 
decade were recurring conflicts, which should remind us—if we needed 
further reminding—that attending to post-conflict transitions is an integral 
part of any intervention.5
These conflicts have most often involved failed or failing states, or 
anocracies—a purgatory-style regime that blends elements of democracy 
and autocracy, without the stabilizing benefits of either.6 Nearly three out of 
every four post-Cold War international crises have involved failed or fail-
ing states, and according to the Failed States Index (sponsored jointly by 
Fund For Peace and Foreign Policy magazine) the number of countries on 
“alert” status has shown a modest but steady increase for the past four to five 
years.7 Anocratic regime states are more than twice as likely to experience 
instability and violent conflict. 
This violence involves competing militias, warring ethnic groups, war-
lords, illicit transnational networks, and informal paramilitary organizations 
not bound by conventional “laws of war.” The illegitimate offspring of crimi-
nal combatants dominate gray zones and lawless “no-go areas,” using their 
ill-gotten gains to fund conflict and buy operational and logistical support. 
This is the reality of the nightmarish nexus of crime and terror.8
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These ugly struggles typically have compli-
cated—if not chaotic—origins, and they tend to 
last for a long time.9 They are notoriously difficult 
to end, and it is always difficult to determine who 
won. Their enduring character is due, in part, to 
the indiscriminate nature of their violence, which 
seeks to break the will of the adversary by destroy-
ing homes, institutions, and infrastructure, which 
breeds a “never forget” mentality in their enemies.10
Warring factions may have either little choice 
or little incentive to end the conflict. Some want 
it to continue because of “greed rather than 
grievance,” since it provides them power, status, 
or money they would not have in its absence.11 
Some continue just because it is what they have 
always done. Child soldiers are increasingly 
lured into these struggles, creating a generation 
that knows only how to fight and has virtually no 
other skills, experience, or prospects. They fight 
because that’s all they know how to do—driving 
what some have called “supply-side war.”12
Small wars are not a new development, and 
America is certainly no stranger to fighting them. 
However, fighting them effectively requires more 
than just experience.13 The U.S. Armed Forces 
have put tremendous effort into learning lessons 
from past conflicts to help them adapt to new 
contingencies, but as the transition from Iraq to 
Afghanistan demonstrated, the next conflict is not 
like the last one.14 
The history of insurgency and small wars—
including contemporary ones—tells us that 
understanding the human dimension of a conflict 
is critically important. There is much more to the 
human dimension than knowing an adversary’s 
culture. Even a deep grasp of culture and social 
dynamics is not sufficient to win a war (though 
a deficient understanding may be enough to lose 
one). Strategy should place less emphasis on 
national-level planning and more on the local 
community level. The state remains relevant as a 
basic unit in the international system, but today’s 
Anti-Gaddafi rebels hoist a child with an AK-47 and flash the “V for Victory” sign, Tripoli, 20 March 2011.
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fragmented, complex conflicts often require us to 
dig deeper. Insurgencies and movements of resis-
tance become living systems.15 They—almost 
literally—take on lives of their own. 
Ultimately, insurgencies usually do not win, 
but their degree of strategic success certainly 
exceeds their disadvantaged size, military 
strength, and sophistication. They do this by 
leveraging their strengths in an asymmetric way. 
The resulting dynamics—some of which are 
obvious—work in their favor. Of course, insur-
gent movements must address the fundamental 
problems facing all armed groups, regardless 
of their history, motivations, or goals. Anthony 
Vinci describes these as the three basic problems 
of mobilization.16 The insurgent needs people 
who want to fight (motivation); the means of 
force, including weapons and survivability 
(logistics); and the ability to exercise direction 
(leadership, organization, and communications). 
The basic tasks themselves are relatively 
straightforward, but how militants approach them 
determines whether they are successful in the 
political and psychological spheres of conflict. 
Those spheres serve as the insurgents’ fulcrum for 
exerting asymmetric power. 
In the sections that follow, I outline seven sig-
nificant sources of power for insurgencies and 
resistance movements:
 ● The power of rising expectations. 
 ● The power of the people.
 ● The power of the underdog.
 ● The power of agility.
 ● The power of resistance.
 ● The power of security.
 ● The power of belonging. 
Understanding them can help explain how and 
why some insurgencies succeed while others do 
not, and help shape strategies for countering them. 
This article is a heuristic, not a historiography. 
The nature and mechanisms of power are dynamic 
and often context dependent. Exceptions exist 
for nearly every rule. With that caveat, I offer my 
thoughts on the following pillars of small war 
power. 
Power of Rising Expectations
“While poverty has rarely been a driving force 
for revolutionary movements and wars, rising 
expectations often have.”—Joint Operating Envi-
ronment, 2008.
Insurgency offers the hope of advancement, 
ascension, or freedom. By definition, insurgencies 
are aspirational. Insurgents do not have a defensive 
“bunker mentality”; revolutionary calls to action 
advance the cause—to make life better, to gain 
essential freedoms. “Without rising aspirations and 
expectations, society would not make the effort and 
take the risks to acquire new forms of behavior 
to achieve greater results.”17 In that sense, rising 
expectations empower regime resistance.18
For centuries, the impoverished and oppressed, 
especially in undeveloped areas of the world, suf-
fered profoundly from “want,” but resigned them-
selves to their fates. Many of the “have-nots” had no 
notion of the lives of the “haves.” They may have 
wished for things to be different, but with no knowl-
edge of anything beyond their own communities, 
they had no sense of what different might look like, 
much less that it might be attainable. Globalization 
and technology have changed that. 
Today, the competitive aspirations of commu-
nities may become even more intense than those 
of nations. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, in 
A soldier teaches children the dangers of land mines, 
Rwanda, 25 June 2007.
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comments to the U.S. Global Leadership Campaign 
on 15 July 2008, forecast that “Over the next 20 
years and more, certain pressures—population, 
resources, energy, economic and environmental cli-
mates—could combine with rapid cultural, social, 
and technological change to produce new sources of 
deprivation, rage, and instability . . . [such that] the 
most persistent and potentially dangerous threats 
will come less from ambitious states than failing 
ones that cannot meet the basic needs—much less 
the aspirations—of their people.” The power of 
rising expectations in fueling conflict is likely to 
get worse before it gets better. 
Early conflict theories advanced the idea that pov-
erty and deprivation were “root causes” of political 
violence. Subsequent evidence has demonstrated 
quite clearly that poverty alone is neither a substan-
tial cause nor a robust predictor.19 (Some suggest a 
more nuanced idea, that perhaps the dynamic is one 
of relative deprivation.20) Research does not sup-
port the idea that discontent is sufficient to inspire 
collective political violence.21 However, discontent 
is one thing and injustice is quite another. Framing 
a problem as an injustice permits the insurgent to 
transform the people’s expectations into action.22
Most theories of radicalization and extremist 
ideology have some element of grievance as a foun-
dational element.23 But why do some grievances 
incite action while others do not? One key reason 
seems to be that those affected view the grievance as 
an injustice.24 The contrast between the way things 
are (what the people have) and the way they think 
things should be (what they should have) fuels these 
perceptions. Rising expectations heighten that gap, 
creating a climate that engenders grievances of ineq-
uity. This, in essence, is where relative deprivation 
leads to perceptions of absolute injustice.25
When the aggrieved see that others do not suffer, 
or have overcome suffering—perhaps through 
revolutionary violence—what once was annoying 
now seems unfair. Because people do not regard 
injustices as random events, it is not difficult to 
place blame on a certain target—a policy, person, 
or nation. The blamed party is then vilified—often 
demonized—which inspires the aggrieved to take 
action to remedy the injustices against them.26
Power of the Underdog
“The underdog often starts the fight, and occa-
sionally the upper dog deserves to win.”—Edgar 
Watson Howe
An insurgent movement is nearly always viewed 
as an underdog. We generally identify and define an 
underdog in relation to a more favored entity—a “top 
dog.” We regard the underdog as being or having 
“less than” the top dog. People like to root for the 
underdog—especially when there is some glimmer 
of hope that the aspirations of the disadvantaged 
party will prevail. Although we widely recognize 
the underdog’s appeal, the mechanisms by which it 
happens are complicated.27
Not surprisingly, a great deal of research shows 
that people do not like to identify themselves as 
losers.28 So what accounts for the urge to root for 
or join the underdog? It’s a question that social 
scientists have only recently started to untangle.29 
A couple of lessons are starting to emerge from 
research in marketing and social psychology. Bear in 
mind that most of the research done on the underdog 
phenomenon has considered fans of different sports 
teams or consumers of certain product brands, not 
insurgencies. 
First, while most people try to view themselves 
positively and wish others to do the same, top dog 
supporters focus on the outcome of performance, 
while underdog supporters focus on the positive 
and attractive qualities of the “players” themselves 
and on the importance of the domain in their own 
lives.30 Second, sustained support does not require 
the underdog to put in a stellar performance, but 
there must at least be intermittent glimmers of 
hope. Stated differently, “underdogs need to come 
close upon occasion or at least show flashes of 
potential in order to merit support; otherwise they 
are just losers and nobody expects anything from 
them.”31 Two additional points are worth men-
tioning about the underdog’s appeal. One is his 
perceived persistence and tenacity in the face of 
adversity, a quality others admire and with which 
many wish to identify. In addition, support for the 
Framing a problem as an 
injustice permits the insur-
gent to transform the people’s 
expectations into action.
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underdog seems to be rooted in people’s percep-
tions of fairness and justice.32 Underdogs are at a 
disadvantage in competition with top dogs. If the 
disadvantaged can succeed, then success—in the 
grand scheme of things—seems more attainable, 
fairer, and more equitable. 
If even some of these dynamics apply in armed 
civil conflicts, the power of the underdog is 
potentially quite important for insurgent move-
ments. For the past 35 years, psychologists have 
investigated a phenomenon they call the “bask 
in reflected glory” effect.33 Basically, this occurs 
when a person associates himself with a group or 
institution that has status, a reputation of popular-
ity, or success (even though the person has had 
nothing to do with that success). Consider how 
some sports fans (a term derived from the word 
“fanatic”) discuss their favorite teams using the 
pronoun “we,” and you get the idea. This effect 
is quite possibly a major factor driving the suc-
cess of an insurgent or terrorist “brand” and the 
reason why more hangers-on seem to associate 
themselves with such groups than the groups 
themselves would recognize as associates. 
Power of Agility 
Rule 1: “Many and small” beats “few and 
large.”—John Arquilla 
One of the great challenges in countering insur-
gent movements is that they are moving targets. 
Their structure, organization, and tactics are fluid. 
They are constantly adapting, evolving, and morph-
ing. Although some insurgent groups historically 
have had a more centralized, paramilitary structure, 
the insurgencies of the 21st century are predomi-
nantly decentralized, dynamic, and agile.34 
Agility is a force’s ability to adapt, to learn, and 
to change (in a timely way) to meet the threats it 
faces.35 Effective insurgent movements are both 
structurally and culturally agile. Agile insurgent 
movements are not only resilient to adversity and 
change, but they also are responsive to it, and they 
adapt accordingly. Setting aside for a moment the 
debate about whether Al-Qaeda is a global insur-
gency movement, consider its agility and evolution. 
What began as a “services support bureau” for 
Afghans resisting Soviet occupation subsequently 
became a “base” for operations by existing terrorist 
groups, then the notional hub of a global network of 
U.S. Army soldiers speak with the family members of a former Al-Qaeda member during a “cordon and search” of the 
town of Jedda, Iraq, 4 June 2008.
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new “affiliate” organizations, then a kind of social 
movement, and ultimately, a “brand” or inspira-
tional hub for a virulent and violent ideology.36
Being agile and adaptive has advantages. Agility 
is perhaps the single most important factor in orga-
nizational learning. The U.S. Army, of course, has 
invested millions of dollars in developing reposi-
tories for “lessons learned” and has assessed and 
identified critical changes necessary for it to adapt 
to the current global security environment.37 But 
these extensive efforts do not guarantee actionable 
adaptations.38 By nature, if not by design, conven-
tional forces tend to be large, heavy, and slow. That 
posture works well in conventional theater opera-
tions but not so well in insurgencies or small wars.39 
A lean, flexible, and decentralized organization 
can move much more quickly from idea to action. 
It can maintain greater compartmentalization to 
enhance operational security and reduce risks from 
extensive, prolonged communications. It can shift 
quickly between kinetic attacks and psychological 
or political activity. It can move money, mobilize 
personnel, and replenish losses in leadership more 
easily. The counterinsurgent is typically running to 
catch up, only to find that when he figures some-
thing out, it has changed or is no longer important. 
Agility is a highly effective force multiplier, espe-
cially against a large, plodding adversary. 
Power of the People
The richest source of power to wage war lies in 
the masses of the people.–Mao Tse-tung 
Contemporary insurgents have a clear home-field 
advantage, which they often exploit to great effect. 
Because insurgents, particularly revolutionaries, take 
up the mantle of resistance, they ostensibly represent 
the people. The extent to which the population per-
ceives their rhetoric as reality drives its support.40 
Chairman Mao referred to a style of small wars as 
“people’s wars.”
In population-centric counterinsurgency doctrine, 
the people are the counterinsurgent’s focus of effort 
and the prize for success.41 Accordingly, many have 
come to regard insurgencies and attempts to counter 
them as essentially “battles for the hearts and minds” 
of the people.42 What may not be immediately appar-
ent, though, is that this battle does not begin at a zero 
baseline for each side. At the outset, the insurgency 
proclaims itself as the justice-seeking voice and 
representative of the people. The counterinsurgent 
must earn, cajole, and maneuver to win the popula-
tion to his side. The insurgent arguably already has 
them, and needs only to retain or not alienate them.
Consider in-group and out-group distinctions (“us” 
and “them”).43 Two common dynamics that tend to 
drive in-group-out-group (intergroup) relationships 
are in-group favoritism (a tendency to evaluate and 
behave more favorably toward in-group members) 
and out-group derogation (a tendency to evalu-
ate and behave more negatively toward out-group 
members).44
Popular support is not only the “richest source 
of power” but also the richest source of energy and 
momentum for the insurgency. Popular support is not 
a sufficient condition for success, but it is necessary 
for resistance to thrive. From a psychological per-
spective, both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent 
would like the population to identify with their group 
and oppose the other group.45
To draw persons into the in-group, the insurgency 
crafts its narrative with an “insider voice,” while 
embedding itself physically and unobtrusively 
throughout the civil population. Insurgents follow 
Mao Tse-tung’s maxim that “the guerrilla must move 
amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea.” They 
aim to be indistinguishable from the people, becom-
ing their voice and amplifying the threat posed by 
the out-group counterinsurgent with persistent pro-
paganda and misinformation. This has the dual effect 
of making the in-group (that they have created) more 
cohesive and increasing opposition to the regime. 
Gaining the support of the people is both the insur-
gents’ primary strategy and their primary objective. 
Chairman Mao said, “Weapons are an important 
factor in war, but not the decisive factor; it is people, 
not things, that are decisive. The contest of strength 
is not only a contest of military and economic power, 
but also a contest of human power and morale. Mili-
tary and economic power is necessarily wielded by 
people.”
Gaining the support of the 
people is both the insurgents’ 
primary strategy and their primary 
objective.
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Power of Resistance
All conditions are more calculable, all obstacles 
more surmountable than those of human resistance.
       — Sir B.H. Liddell Hart
Insurgents do not just use asymmetric tactics; they 
do so in the context of asymmetric strategies. The 
insurgent’s most fundamental objective is simply to 
thwart the counterinsurgent’s objectives. We may 
think of this as “monkey wrench power.” Throwing 
a monkey wrench is a form of sabotage. The purpose 
of sabotage is to interfere with a competitor’s goals 
and interests and to create disorder. Disorder is the 
strategic friend of the insurgent and the foe of the 
regime. 
Insurgent movements often do not aim for decisive 
victory, but rather to prevent the counterinsurgent 
from achieving victory. They seek to be winning, 
not necessarily to be victorious. To be winning, the 
insurgent need only to disrupt, break, and resist. He 
does not have to build, create, or sustain. In nearly 
every way, the insurgent’s burden is much easier 
than that of the counterinsurgent. Henry Kissinger 
noted nearly a half century ago, “The guerrilla wins 
if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if 
it does not win.”46 This asymmetry is the essence of 
resistance and it gives the insurgent an enormous 
advantage. 
The asymmetries of constraint further multiply the 
insurgency’s power. The insurgent has much more 
tactical latitude to resist than the state has to quell the 
resistance. Insurgent tactics are constrained only by 
the ethos and popular support of the people. As long 
as the insurgent is able to take the people’s side, he 
can largely use any means they wish.
The insurgent’s grand strategy of “not losing” 
involves persistently provoking, disrupting, and 
exhausting counterinsurgent forces. The insurgents 
provoke the state, hoping counterinsurgent forces 
will overreact with excessive force. The resisters then 
flaunt and leverage that regime’s response in order 
to mobilize their own popular support.
They disrupt the counterinsurgent with every 
demonstration of active resistance (since the coun-
terinsurgent’s goal is to stop the resistance) and by 
showing the populace that the state cannot ensure the 
security of its people. Few tactics are more effective 
in this regard than intermittent, indiscriminant acts 
of violence. Creating a climate of fear and general 
disorder further undermines the regime’s legitimacy.
Finally, insurgents exhaust regime forces by drain-
ing their fiscal and personnel resources, compelling 
them to protect “everything” and rebuild what the 
insurgent has destroyed, while thwarting their ability 
to capitalize on any success or to gain any momen-
tum. Few forces and certainly few nations have 
the political will to persist against such prolonged 
adversity. 
Power of Belonging
Comradeship makes a man feel warm and coura-
geous when all his instincts tend to make him cold 
and afraid.—Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery 
Insurgent movements offer a way to belong, to 
be part of something bigger than oneself, to experi-
ence the bonds of affiliation, and to be empowered 
with a role that has meaning and purpose.47 These 
are powerful—if intangible—rewards for the most 
vulnerable subgroup of prospective members. The 
promise of belonging draws them in, and if properly 
managed, keeps them engaged and loyal.48 Loyalty 
is most often built on a platform of connectedness, 
a shared identity, and a shared sense of belonging. 
Observations on recruitment within terrorist and 
violent extremist organizations show that many 
people join to gain solidarity with family, friends, 
or acquaintances.49 “For the individuals who become 
active terrorists, the initial attraction is often to the 
group, or community of believers, rather than to an 
abstract ideology or to violence.”50 As is true for 
many forms of collective violence, from terrorism 
USAID-supported rehabilitation programs assist in return-
ing these young boys to a normal society, Rwanda, 25 
June 2007.
(U
S
A
ID
)
42 July-August 2011  MILITARY REVIEW 
to conventional combat, individuals are more often 
mobilized to act because of their commitments to 
other people rather than commitments to causes 
and abstract ideals. 
While some people participate in or support an 
insurgency because of a principled dedication to the 
cause, for many others being part of the insurgency 
is basically an end unto itself. It gives them a sense 
of purpose and an identity.51 The psychological 
motive is primary, while the ideological/political 
motive is secondary. However, even for those who 
are “true believers,” the feeling of belonging often 
has a powerful pull.52
It is no coincidence that the wellspring of most 
resistance movements flows from a pool of alien-
ated and angry young men. Modern small war 
conflicts capitalize on identity-based security 
threats, which are particularly incendiary issues 
for that demographic category.53 Steven Metz and 
Raymond Millen of the Strategic Studies Institute 
note, “Insurgents inspire resistance and recruitment 
by defiance, particularly among young males with 
the volatile combination of boredom, anger, and 
lack of purpose. Insurgency can provide a sense of 
adventure, excitement, and meaning that transcends 
its political objectives.”54 With the global “youth 
bulge,” about 87 percent of world’s populations 
between the ages of 10 and 19 now live in develop-
ing countries, many of which are furnaces of politi-
cal instability stoked by curtailed modernity and an 
ethos of nonstate belonging and boundaries.55 This 
suggests perhaps that the highest risk group for an 
uprising—demographically and psychosocially—is 
now densely concentrated in the world’s riskiest and 
most volatile spaces. 
Power of Security
Most people want security in this world, not 
liberty.—H.L. Mencken
Budding insurgents often find within the move-
ment an essential sense of physical, social, and 
emotional security. Physically, there is strength in 
numbers. Socially, mutual accountability and trust 
breeds loyalty. Emotionally, the ideology, doctrine, 
and rules of the group provide a reassuring sense 
of structure. 
Virtually every briefing these days on the char-
acter of insurgency or irregular warfare includes 
a pyramid graphic illustrating the “hierarchy of 
needs.” In the first half of the 20th century, psy-
chologist Abraham Maslow developed a theory 
for understanding human motivation, which he 
A Hezbollah supporter waves a Hezbollah flag during a rally of “Liberation Day,” which marks the withdrawal of the Israeli
army from southern Lebanon in 2000, Baalbek, Lebanon, 25 May 2011.
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based on a hierarchical constellation of human 
needs. Most fundamental are basic physiological 
needs like food and water. Just above that lies the 
category of “safety” needs.56 As a practical matter, 
those combined categories comprise the essence of 
human security—freedom from want (physiologi-
cal needs) and freedom from fear (safety needs).57
Insurgents create fear and disorder, then use 
them to mobilize support. A climate of disorder 
undermines confidence in the regime’s ability to 
protect its citizens.58 Disorder can enhance fear 
even more than increases in crime or actual risk of 
harm.59 Civil conflicts, ethnic/religious tensions, 
and drug trafficking all contribute to a commu-
nity’s sense of fearful insecurity. “This sense of 
insecurity has led to a growing realization that the 
provision of security itself as a public good—the 
very raison d’être of the states system—can no 
longer be guaranteed by that system.”60
Fear often works as a tactic when the fear-
inducing message includes a proposed solution 
or an option for security.61 Between the regime 
and the counterinsurgent, whoever appears to 
be in control—or appears uncontrollable by the 
other—will have an upper hand in managing the 
climate of community safety and the security of the 
populace.62 The state that does not govern, secure, 
or take care of its people abdicates its power to 
those who will. 
A wrinkle in the contemporary challenge is that 
insurgent groups now not only seek to manipulate 
and dominate the threats to community security, 
but also increasingly seek to offer services and 
solutions.63 Hezbollah has been an exemplar of 
this approach, though it is certainly not the only 
group to use it.64 Hezbollah is perhaps best known 
in the West for its persistent and horrific acts of 
terrorism, including its association with the pivotal 
suicide bombings of  U.S. Marine Corps barracks 
in Beirut, which arguably ushered in the modern 
era of suicide terrorism. Hezbollah also has a sig-
nificant network of social and medical services, 
which it creates and sustains in areas with great 
need and deficient infrastructure. When illness or 
crisis threatens, victims often have little choice 
but to turn to Hezbollah and its facilities for help. 
Hezbollah will help with a generous spirit, without 
requiring allegiance or demanding reciprocity. 
It does not impose services on the population or 
tell the citizens what they need. Rather, Hezbol-
lah identifies the needs and gaps neglected by the 
state, builds capacity, and attracts those in need. 
(The idea of using attraction rather than promo-
tion is a subtlety often lost on counterinsurgents.) 
Hezbollah has learned that securing the population 
from want also secures their loyalty and support. 
Conclusion
We should take a step back from our current 
obsession with “terrorism” and the next “big 
attack” and keep an eye on disorderly, ungoverned 
spaces; the evolving character of armed groups 
and nonstate collectives; and the erosive, insidi-
ous damage rendered to global security by the 
thousand small cuts of community conflict.
Wars are “primarily human endeavors.” Small 
wars are less amenable, however, to nation-centric 
analysis. Neither our adversary nor his armed 
forces are monolithic. We may need to modify our 
traditional “center of gravity” analysis to accom-
modate multiple centers of gravity in an asym-
metric diffusion of power. Insurgencies and move-
ments of resistance are dynamic, living systems 
powered by social dynamics.65 Successful insur-
gent movements leverage their available sources of 
power to gain the sympathy of the broader popula-
tion and to mobilize a small cadre of armed forces. 
For the insurgent, these dynamics—the power of 
rising expectations, the power of the people, the 
power of the underdog, the power of agility, the 
power of resistance, the power of security, and 
the power of belonging—become the pillars of 
small war power. For the counterinsurgent, each 
of these pillars presents both a potential hazard 
and an exploitable vulnerability. 
General James Mattis said of the U.S. effort in 
Iraq, “Sometimes wars are won by the side that 
makes the fewest mistakes, and the enemy made 
mistake after mistake after mistake. And we, on 
our side, when we saw we made a mistake, we 
corrected ourselves. And so the enemy is working 
amongst the population, and eventually the people 
identified that we were the ones doing things 
right and that the enemy was working against the 
people’s best interest. So they turned on them.”66 
In Iraq, U.S. forces arguably prevailed by under-
mining and toppling the insurgency’s pillars of 
power. MR
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